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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Context
The world has become increasingly interdependent, and many envi-
ronmental concerns now transcend national boundaries. International
cooperation in recent years has resulted in agreements or proposals
concerning such international subjects as marine fishery resources, 1
whale preservation,2 acid rain abatement,3 global warming prevention,4
* Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
** Tyler Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1963, Central Michigan
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1. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
2. See, eg., International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done Dec. 2,
1946, 62 Stat. (2) 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948).
3. See, e.g., Erik K. Moller, The United States-Canadian Acid Rain Crisis: Proposal
for an International Agreement, 36 UCLA L. Rlv. 1207 (1989).
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ozone layer protection,5 Antarctic resource preservation, 6 and regula-
tion of international waterway pollution.7 More such proposals are
likely in the wake of the Rio Conference.' Most of these initiatives are
bilateral or multilateral: two or more countries mutually agree to take
steps within their boundaries to solve perceived problems of potential
international scope.
The United States has developed what is probably the most ad-
vanced legal system for environmental protection in the world. Most
American environmental law operates only domestically. In several in-
stances, however, federal statutes apply beyond national boundaries.
Many of these statutes concern relations defined by bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty. Thus, for instance, the number of seals harvested in the
Pribilof Islands,9 the seasons for migratory bird hunting,'" whaling re-
strictions, " trade in endangered species,' 2 and a wide variety of similar
regulations are governed both by treaties and by domestic law imple-
menting those treaties.13
Occasionally, Congress has acted unilaterally in ways that affect the
domestic policies of other countries vis-a-vis the environment. This is
4. See, eg., Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States
and International Law, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 222 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, done
Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
6. See, eg., Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment
Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG. 120/30 (1985);
Brian Robert Murphy, Note, Antarctic Treaty System - Does the Minerals Regime
Signal the Beginning of the End?, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 523 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwater:
The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 6 TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP. No. 2 at 1 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, New Environmental Debate Expected as U.N. Convenes,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at A10.
9. Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187 (1988). See International Fund v.
Baldrige, 594 F. Supp. 129 (D.D.C. 1984) (applying the Act to proposed seal killing).
10. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1988). See George C. Cog-
gins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 165 (1979) for an historical analysis of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act.
11. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 2.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(c) (1988) (prohibiting trade or possession of endangered spe-
cies). This section implements the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249
(entered into force July 1, 1975).
13. See generally MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 252-78 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the international aspects of federal wildlife law).
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often accomplished through some form of trade restriction. For exam-
ple, the United States forbids the import of marine mammal products if
the animals are taken in a manner contrary to American law.14 Similar
restrictions apply to the importation of foreign tuna, 15 and Congress
has legislated directly against continuance of whaling by Japan.
16
Products from species declared by the United States to be threatened
or endangered cannot be imported into this country even if the export-
ing nation does not protect the species. 7 In these instances, the United
States uses its enormous market power to coerce other countries into
adopting what Congress considers to be better environmental practices.
The executive branch, leery of foreign reactions, often has tried to
water down the consequences called for in the legislation, sometimes
successfully.'" In addition, authorities of the international General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade currently are challenging the United
States' ban on importation of tuna.19
Another form of unilateral action exercised by Congress in recent
years seeks even more influence over the environmental policies of
other countries. International institutions often finance economic de-
velopment projects in less developed countries. Many countries and
organizations have noted with dismay the potential consequences of
some such development projects: desertification, tropical deforesta-
tion, pollution, erosion, and loss of wildlife resources.20 Congress in
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1372(b), (c) (1988). See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (granting standing to environmental groups challenging the gov-
ernment's decision to allow the importation of baby sealskin furs into the United
States).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(c)(3) (1988).
16. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)
(holding that the Secretary of Commerce is required to report Japan's failure to abide
by the whaling quotas because it diminished the effectiveness of the regulation of
whaling).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. at 223
(holding that the Executive branch retains a significant amount of discretion in deter-
mining violations of Whaling Regulations); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d at
1013 (Executive branch unsuccessfully attempted to waive statutory requirements of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act).
19. See, e.g., Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Envi-
ronment and Trade: The GA7T Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10268
(1992); Hilary S. French, The Tuna Test: GATT and the Environment, 6 TRANS-
BOUNDARY RESOURCES REP. No. 2 at 6 (1992).
20. E.g., Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, U.N. Doc.
UNEP GC. 14/17 Annex III (1987); N. MYERs, THE PRIMARY SOURCE: TROPICAL
Washington University Open Scholarship
62 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:59
several instances has instructed United States government officials
serving as executives in the World Bank and regional development
banks to oppose development projects unless an environmental evalua-
tion of the project (the functional equivalent of an environmental im-
pact statement) has first been prepared and submitted for review.21
B. The Question
Recently, environmental organizations tried, unsuccessfully, to liti-
gate the question whether Congress intended the procedural and sub-
stantive structures of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)22 to apply
extraterritorially. This article focuses on that question and the conse-
quences of an affirmative answer.
The ESA arguably is the strictest and most far-reaching wildlife
preservation law ever enacted by any jurisdiction.23 After a species of
animal24 has been officially listed as endangered or threatened,25 the
Act imposes a variety of protective requirements. International and
domestic commerce in the species is forbidden;26 no one can "take" a
listed species in the United States or on the high seas; 27 critical habitat
is to be designated;28 and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
FORESTS AND OUR FUTURE (1984); LYNTON K. CARDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY (1984).
21. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text discussing environmental
conditionality.
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
23. See generally George C. Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail
Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L. J.
1433 (1982).
24. Plant species are also eligible for listing and protection, but the Act treats them
differently from fauna. See George C. Coggins & Anne F. Harris, The Greening of
American Law?: The Recent Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27
NAT. RESOURCE J. 247, 278-304 (1987) (evaluating ESA's coverage and implementa-
tion in the context of plant preservation).
25. The term "endangered species" is defined as any species in danger of extinction
throughout most of its range. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988). A "threatened species" is
any species that is likely to become an endangered species in the foreseeable future. Id.
§ 1532(20). See also id § 1533 (express language defining an endangered or threatened
species).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1988).
27. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A), (B). According to the ESA, "take" means to kill, capture,
pursue, hunt, shoot, or trap. An "attempt" to engage in any such conduct also falls
within the scope of the Act. Id. § 1532(19).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3), (b)(2).
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(FWS) is to prepare a recovery plan.29 Apparently, all concerned agree
that these strictures do not apply on foreign soil.
There is no such agreement, however, with respect to Section 7 of
the ESA. That section requires all federal agencies to conserve listed
species and to insure that their administrative actions neither jeopard-
ize such species nor degrade their critical habitats."0 To achieve those
ends, the Act sets up a complex, detailed scheme whereby the action
agency must consult with the FWS.31 The FWS performs biological
studies and issues an opinion. If the FWS concludes that the action
and the welfare of the species would irreconcilably conflict, even after
mitigation measures are instituted, the action cannot go forward. A
last resort, seldom used, is clearance by a cabinet level committee
known as the "God Squad." 3
2
Section 7 is not, on its face, limited to domestic application. Instead,
it purports to bind every federal agency in all circumstances without
reference to geography.3 3 By way of regulations issued in 1978, the
Carter Administration took the view that the Section 7 consultation
requirements applied to federal agencies that take actions abroad.34 In
1986, however, the Reagan Administration repealed that part of the
regulations.35 Several environmental groups challenged the legality of
29. Id. § 1533(0. A recovery plan that promotes the survival of endangered species
must describe (1) a site-specific management action; (2) objective, measurable criteria to
remove certain species from the protected list; and (3) an estimate of the time and cost
to carry out the necessary measures. Id. § 1533(0(1)(3).
30. Section 7 of ESA is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1988). See Coggins & Rus-
sell, supra note 23, at 1461-69 (discussing the duties established by Section 7).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a).
32. The "God Squad" is also known as the Endangered Species Committee. The
Act created this Committee to expedite and improve the consultation process of ESA.
The Committee is composed of seven members: (a) the Secretary of Agriculture; (b) the
Secretary of the Army; (c) the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; (d) the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; (e) the Secretary of Interior; (f)
the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and (g)
the President of the United States. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1988). See Coggins & Russell,
supra note 23, at 1487-95 for a discussion of the Committee's functions and activities.
33. The statutory language of § 1536(a)(2) states that each federal agency shall in-
sure that "any action authorized, funded or carried out by the agency... [may] not
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species" (emphasis added). Thus,
the scope of this regulation is not limited to the United States.
34. Interagency Cooperation - Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 874
(1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1985)).
35. Interagency Cooperation - Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 51
Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1991)).
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that repeal in a lawsuit that reached the United States Supreme Court
in 1992, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.36 The Court ruled that plain-
tiffs lacked standing to bring the suit, thus avoiding the substantive
question of extraterritoriality. 7
Eventually, either Congress or the courts must resolve that question.
The United States government conducts many kinds of activities
abroad that have direct and indirect consequences for environmental
quality generally and wildlife welfare specifically. For instance, one
focal point of the Defenders litigation was participation by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the
Mahaweli development project in Sri Lanka. 8 That project encom-
passed the construction of dams, waterways, lakes, reservoirs, and irri-
gation systems.39 These structural changes essentially remolded south
central Sri Lanka. Environmentalists claimed that the project would
irreparably harm wildlife, including several endangered species." The
Mahaweli project is only one example of USAID's involvement in op-
erations outside the United States.41 Similarly, many other federal
agencies have missions that include international assistance and con-
sultation on development projects abroad.42
The next section of this article describes the Defenders litigation and
the Court's procedural ruling. The third section analyzes the un-
resolved substantive question and concludes that, more likely than not,
Congress did not intend extraterritorial application of Section 7. Con-
gress of course has the power to order agencies to follow American
legal guidelines even when operating abroad. If a court finds that the
ESA, as now constituted or as subsequently amended, does have extra-
territorial application, a new series of questions will arise. Section IV
of this article addresses some of those questions, emphasizing
"superterritoriality" as well as extraterritoriality, in the context of de-
36. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
37. Id. at 2146. See infra notes 43-79 and accompanying text.
38. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
39. See Julian Weiss, Sri Lanka's Economy Starts to Snap Back, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 30, 1989, at 9, col. 1.
40. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
41. See infra note 104 and accompanying text for a description of USAID's finan-
cial assistance programs.
42. Agencies within the State, Interior, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce De-
partments, inter alia, have some foreign responsibilities.
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velopment assistance projects of the type referred to in the Defenders
litigation.
II. THE ESA AND THE DEFENDERS CASE
In enacting the Endangered Species Act, Congress unquestionably
was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to conserve all species
worldwide, not just in the United States. To that end, the ESA (1)
empowers the Secretary of the Interior to designate as endangered or
threatened any wildlife species in the world,4 3 (2) instructs the govern-
ment to cooperate with other countries," and (3) provides that prod-
ucts from listed species cannot be imported into this country.4 5
Roughly half of the ESA's provisions refer to international considera-
tions. Congress did not make it a crime, however, for an American to
"take" a listed species on the land or in the territorial sea of another
country. 6
Defenders involved the question whether ESA Section 7 applies (and
if so, how) to federal agencies operating in foreign countries. Section 7
imposes three related but distinct duties on all federal agencies. Such
agencies must (1) affirmatively "conserve" listed species,47 (2) "insure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out" by them is not
likely to "jeopardize" a listed species,48 and (3) likewise insure that
such action is not likely to destroy a listed species' designated "critical
habitat."'4 9 Although the relevant provision is silent on whether the
Secretary of the Interior has a duty to designate critical habitat for
species in other countries, the Interior Secretary has argued that he
does not have any such duty, and that position has not been
challenged.50
Plaintiffs in Defenders alleged that federal agencies funding or assist-
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1988).
44. Id. § 1537.
45. Id. §§ 1538(a), (c), (d).
46. Id. § 1538(a)(1). Cf. United States v. Mitchell, 533 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that the criminal prohibitions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 do not "reach conduct in the territorial waters of a foreign sovereignty").
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988). See 2 GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 15.05[2][d] (1992) for a discussion of the ESA's affirmative conser-
vation duty.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
49. Id.
50. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2150 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ing with projects in other countries were bound to follow the ESA Sec-
tion 7 consultation procedures if the projects threatened to harm listed
species. The Secretary of the Interior had so construed the statute in
1978,51 but the State Department did not concede the accuracy of that
interpretation,52 and in 1986, the Interior Department rewrote the reg-
ulation to delete the reference to foreign operations.5 3 The major ques-
tions presented in Defenders were whether the plaintiffs had standing
to sue, and, if so, whether the statute required foreign application.
Before 1990, standing law in general was confused at best, but stand-
ing to sue in domestic natural resource law cases was seldom a prob-
lem.54  In Sierra Club v. Morton ,5  a 1972 decision concerning a
national forest ski development, the Supreme Court held that public
interest organizations have standing to challenge governmental actions
if their members "use" the area to be affected and the development or
action would offend their aesthetic sensibilities.56 Subsequent Supreme
Court opinions found standing even when the harm to plaintiff was
extremely attenuated or remote57 - evidently because the Court de-
sired to answer the substantive questions presented by those cases.58
The established conservation organizations such as the Sierra Club, the
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-42.
53. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
54. See Karin Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental
Standing to Constrain the Courts, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10557, 10558
(1990) for an historical analysis of environmental standing cases.
55. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
56. Id. at 735.
57. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (grant-
ing standing to wildlife conservation groups seeking to compel the Secretary of Com-
merce to certify that Japan's fishing operations diminished the effectiveness of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling); Bryan v. Yellen, 447 U.S.
352, 367-68 (1980) (granting standing to person who had sufficient interest in the con-
troversy because application of a federal reclamation law would make it likely that ex-
cess lands would become available at less than market prices); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73 (1978) (holding that appellees had
standing to challenge the constitutionality of legislation allowing for the construction of
nuclear power plants; appellees claimed they were harmed by the power plants which
were in potentially dangerous proximity to their living and working environment);
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973) (granting standing to unincorporated
association whose members claimed that increased rates for railroad freight would cause
direct economic harm, as well as harm to their aesthetic and environmental well-being).
58. In each of the cases cited in the preceding note, and not at all coincidentally, the
Court found against plaintiff on the merits.
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National Resources Defense Council, the Audubon Society, and the
National Wildlife Federation were routinely granted standing by
nearly all courts in nearly all situations.59
The 1990 Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation'° decision marked
an abrupt change of uncertain magnitude. In a five to four decision,
the Court dismissed a suit on standing grounds because the plaintiff's
initial affidavits were deemed insufficient 6' - even though all con-
cerned were aware that plaintiff, the nation's largest conservation or-
ganization, in fact met every standing test hitherto devised.62 The
Court did not purport to change the test for standing, however, and its
confusing opinion raised far more questions than it answered.63 De-
fenders continues that trend.
To demonstrate standing, plaintiff must show injury in fact, causa-
tion, and redressability. In Defenders, two members of plaintiff organi-
zation swore that each had visited a foreign site where United States-
assisted projects threatened listed species, that each intended to return
to the site, and that the extinction of the species there caused by the
projects would harm their personal and professional interests in wild-
life. The district court originally dismissed the suit for lack of stand-
ing, but the Eighth Circuit reversed that ruling and later affirmed the
determination that the defendants had violated the ESA. 4 The case
had bounced around the Eighth Circuit for nearly six years by the time
the Supreme Court remanded it in June 1992 for "proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion. ' '65
The case generated four opinions from the Supreme Court. Justice
Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Thomas. The main thrusts of Scalia's analysis
were that plaintiffs had demonstrated neither injury in fact nor redres-
sability and consequently lacked standing.66 In a concurring opinion
59. Cf. I COGGINS, supra note 47, at § 6.05[2][a].
60. 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990).
61. Id. at 3187-88.
62. See 1 COGGINS, supra note 47, at § 6.05[2][a].
63. Id.
64. The Defenders litigation at the trial level and in the Eighth Circuit is reported at
658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987); 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988); 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D.
Minn. 1989); 911 F.2d 117 (1990). In the first three of these cases, the defendant was
then-Secretary of the Interior Donald P. Hodel.
65. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2146.
66. Id. at 2137-42.
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written by Justice Kennedy, he and Justice Souter agreed that the nec-
essary injury was lacking, but they declined to address redressability
and cautioned that the Court must be "sensitive" to new rights and
forms of action.67 Justice Stevens also concurred in the result, but for
different reasons: he opined that plaintiffs had standing but that their
substantive claim was ill-founded.68 Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
dissented on the standing issue.69
The Court's recent approach to standing questions in natural re-
sources law has been highly fact-specific and technical. The Court has
not directly overturned the 1970s precedents which made standing for
environmental organizations relatively easy to prove. However, the
Court's new emphases, and the lurking hostility of Justice Scalia to all
"public interest" litigation,70 suggest that courts will cut back, more or
less drastically, on that easy availability. As matters stand now, how-
ever, a plaintiff could gain standing to challenge the rule at issue if he
or she had airplane tickets to return to the foreign wildlife site in dan-
ger.71 That may sound silly, but Justice Kennedy confirmed that just
such a technicality was the hinge on which the decision swung.72
Cynical observers may conclude that the Court's standing opinions
are post hoc exercises in avoiding questions the Court prefers not to
decide. The Court itself often notes the asymmetry and inconsistency
of its semantic tests and results.73 The two recent Lujan and Defenders
decisions, however, evidence a deeper commitment to narrowing the
ability of courts to oversee administrative actions. Justice Scalia has
stated that courts should strive to elevate the power of the executive
over that of Congress,74 and that standing, as a function of separation
of powers, is an appropriate vehicle of interpretation to serve that
67. Id. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2147-51 (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2151-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. Rav. 881, 891 (1983) (arguing that plaintiff orga-
nizations such as the NAACP or American Civil Liberties Union rarely proffer a con-
crete injury in fact; and that the doctrine of standing should exclude this type of
litigation altogether).
71. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
72. Id. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. E.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.").
74. Scalia, supra note 70, at 883-84.
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end.75 Most Justices have not concurred with Scalia's more radical
propositions, but his suggestive language76 was joined by several other
Justices in Defenders.
Public interest lawsuits will be more complex and difficult for many
plaintiffs in the foreseeable future. Standing (and ripeness) challenges
will encumber all stages of the litigation. Administrative law might
well come to resemble civil procedure in the 1820s, with all parties
concerned more about the pleadings and motions than the real substan-
tive issues. Metaphysical pronouncements often have that effect.
The Defenders Court did not decide whether the ESA's Section 7
applies extraterritorially, although Justice Stevens concluded that it did
not. It thus remains open to a person who can demonstrate actual - if
only aesthetic - harm in a concrete situation to litigate the question
again. Evidently, wildlife professionals (biologists, managers, nature
writers, etc.) will have standing if they are familiar with a species in the
affected area and have firm plans to revisit the area. Perhaps foreign
nationals living in the affected area also would have standing. Such a
future litigant might, however, face a "Catch 22": even though a case
is unripe or unredressable until such time as a concrete application of
the new policy is actually made by the federal agency, 77 a court may
hold that the litigant nevertheless is barred by the general six year stat-
ute of limitations78 for such federal claims,7 9 at least if it is the 1986
regulation that is the object of the challenge.
The remainder of this article examines the substantive question of
the ESA's applicability to operations on foreign soil. Section III con-
cludes that a court addressing this substantive question in the future
will likely agree with Justice Stevens that Congress did not intend to
extend ESA Section 7 to such operations. Section IV then looks be-
yond that issue to another: if in the future Congress wishes to give
75. Id. See also Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under Envi-
ronmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REv. 97, 107 (1987).
76. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136: "Obviously, then, the Constitution's central
mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common understandings of
what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts .... One of
those landmarks ... is the doctrine of standing." Id. (citation omitted).
77. Lujan v. NWF, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988).
79. Cf. Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that standing to sue is not a prerequisite of the six-year statute of limitation
period on civil actions against the United States). See 1 COGOINS, supra note 47, at
§ 9.03[2][a].
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Section 7 a wider territorial application, how far can it go? Specifically,
in the context of foreign development assistance projects like the
Mahaweli project, should the ESA bind United States government offi-
cials who serve as executives of the World Bank or the regional devel-
opment banks?
III. APPLYING THE CURRENT ESA TO BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Plaintiff presented the substantive issue in Defenders largely as one
of extraterritoriality: does ESA Section 7 apply to actions of "Federal
agencies" taken in foreign countries? The type of action at issue in
Defenders was USAID participation in economic development
projects, particularly the Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka.
In looking beyond the Defenders case, a wider view of the issue
should be taken. After all, economic development projects are usually
joint efforts. Most of the financing for them comes not from USAID or
from other individual countries, but instead from multilateral develop-
ment banks. These banks are international organizations with some of
the attributes of sovereign countries, but of course without territory.
Therefore, whether ESA Section 7 applies to those banks is a more
basic question than simple extraterritoriality. Instead, it is one of
"superterritoriality." Both the district court and the court of appeals
in the Defenders case declared, without discussion or citation of au-
thority, that the World Bank is not a federal agency. 0 The reply brief
filed on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior reiterated that point and
provided authority for the proposition that the World Bank also is not
an "instrumentality" of the United States."1 Those conclusions,
although correct, are too simplistic. They do not settle the question
whether the ESA applies to United States participation in the multilat-
eral development banks.82
Subsection A below considers the applicability of the ESA in its cur-
rent formulation83 to bilateral development assistance provided
80. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. at 47 n.6; Defenders of Wildlife v.
Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1041.
81. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4 n.1, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992) (No. 90-1424).
82. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
83. Reauthorization of the ESA has generated considerable political controversy
because its domestic applications, particularly with respect to the Northern spotted owl,
have had severe consequences on some economic interests. Most past amendments to
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through USAID. Subsection B examines the possible superterritorial
application of the ESA through United States participation in the mul-
tilateral development banks.
A. The ESA's Extraterritoriality and Bilateral Development
Assistance
The extraterritoriality issue - whether United States laws should be
applied to persons or circumstances outside the territory of the United
States - has arisen in several contexts, including securities law, export
controls, competition law, and corrupt business practices. The
Supreme Court has developed a presumption against extraterritorial
application, but the presumption is rebuttable with evidence of con-
gressional intent to extend the legislative scope beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.85 The power of Congress to dictate
standards to federal agencies operating abroad is clear; the question in
Defenders was whether Congress intended to do so in the ESA.
ESA Section 7 reads in pertinent part:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with.., the Secretary
[of the Interior] insure that any action authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of any endangered species or any threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [the critical
habitat of such a species].86
A literal reading of Section 7 supports plaintiffs' argument for extra-
territorial application, because Congress did not limit or condition the
the ESA, however, have been in the direction of enhanced environmental protection.
See, e.g., Coggins & Harris, supra note 24, at 278 (amendments considerably strength-
ened the legal protection of vulnerable plant species).
84. See, eg., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988); The Export
Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1988); The Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988); The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988); The Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(1) (1988); The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd, 78ff(a) (1988).
85. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (congressional legisla-
tion does not apply outside territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary
intent appears).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988). Both the 1978 and the 1986 regulations use simi-
lar language. In the 1978 regulations, the pertinent wording was "activities or pro-
grams." 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978). In the 1986 regulations, the language in the
corresponding passage was changed to "action it authorizes, funds, or carries out." A
separate passage defined "action" as "activities and programs of any kind .. " 51 Fed.
Reg. 19,926 (1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1991)).
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application of Section 7 in any way, geographically or otherwise. The
Court in TVA v. Hill,87 construing essentially the same wording, held
that a literal interpretation is appropriate, regardless of "common
sense," if the congressional will to reject qualifications is clear.3 8 Con-
gress provided express limitations to the applicability of other ESA sec-
tions,89 bolstering the inference that if Congress had wished to confine
Section 7 to domestic application, it would have expressly said so.
One reading of the statute as a whole also supports extraterritorial
application. In a myriad of references, Congress made it abundantly
clear that it was concerned with all species of wildlife worldwide, and
not just in the United States. The Act's purposes include carrying out
wildlife protection treaties.90 Indeed, one entire section refers solely to
the implementation of two major wildlife preservation treaties.91 Sev-
eral sections focus on foreign commerce,92 and others clearly contem-
plate the listing of species on foreign soil.93 The statute also draws
distinctions between domestic and foreign applications in other con-
texts.94 Finally, Section 7 itself expressly mandates cooperation with
other countries.95
These arguments supporting extraterritorial application of Section 7
are persuasive, especially in light of Chief Justice Burger's admonition
against judicial rewriting after Congress has spoken.96 Nevertheless,
the government's position (opposing extraterritorial application) is
likely to prevail upon further litigation of the question, especially if
that litigation arises in the context of USAID bilateral financial
assistance.
First, Section 7 is ambiguous: although it does not rule out extrater-
ritorial application, neither does it expressly require it. The legislative
history is devoid of good evidence either way. Considered in light of
the presumption against extraterritoriality, that alone might be disposi-
tive, as Justice Stevens seemed to assume. One may reasonably expect
87. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
88. Id. at 180.
89. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(b), 1539 (1988).
90. Id. § 1531(b).
91. Id. § 1537a.
92. Id. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), (B), 1538.
93. Id. § 1533(b).
94. Id. § 1538(a).
95. Id. § 1537.
96. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
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that Congress would at least discuss an expansion of jurisdiction of
that magnitude. Further, the "critical habitat" language in Section 7
almost certainly applies only domestically.9 7 Nowhere in the legisla-
tive history did Congress evince an intent to "sever" any part of Sec-
tion 7 from another part for geographic or other purposes.9"
Second, Congress expressly dealt with foreign concerns in several
sections,9 9 suggesting that extraterritorial application was not intended
for other provisions, or for the Act as a whole. For example, the provi-
sions of Section 8 on "international cooperation ''" ° ° do nothing to sup-
port an expansive interpretation of Section 7, because Section 8 defines
the areas, subjects, and methods of cooperation. 1
Third, making Section 7 applicable on foreign soil raises certain
political and practical problems that Congress should have at least
mentioned had it actually intended extraterritorial application. Many
of these problems arise in the case of USAID operations. In fact, the
language of Section 7 makes little sense in the context of a USAID-
supported project overseas.
All three of the operative verbs in Section 7 - "authorize[ ],"
"fund[ ]," and "carr[y] out'"1 2 - could apply in the case of a USAID-
supported project, but very different meanings attach to each. First,
USAID must authorize support for a project. That authorization con-
stitutes an "agency action," but that "action" arguably takes place in
the United States. If so, no issues of extraterritoriality would be raised
at all. Second, once a project has been so "authorized," it then will be
"funded," at least in part, by USAID - an action that might or might
not be viewed as taking place in the United States. 10 3 Finally, the pro-
ject itself will be "carried out" in the foreign country. In many cases,
however, a project supported by USAID is not in fact carried out by
USAID but instead by the foreign government or independent contrac-
tors hired by that government.
97. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
98. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2150 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1988).
101. Id.
102. See supra note 86 and accompanying text giving the pertinent language of Sec-
tion 7.
103. "Funding" might take place, for example, either when the project is authorized
and an account established on USAID's records or when funds are forwarded to the
recipient government or to suppliers of goods and services.
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As applied in the case of USAID operations, then, the "authorized,
funded, or carried out" language seems ill-suited as a definition of "ac-
tion" of a federal agency. This suggests that Justice Stevens was cor-
rect in his concurring opinion in Defenders: Congress almost surely
did not consider whether the ESA should apply to USAID's develop-
ment assistance operations. Further, the legislative history of the ESA
gives no indication that Congress thought about the applicability of
Section 7 in the context of bilateral development assistance. This is an
expansion of such magnitude that Congress reasonably could have
been expected to discuss it.
The reasonable conclusion emerging from this review of the text, the
context, the legislative history, and other sources of guidance as to the
meaning of Section 7 is that that provision was not designed to apply to
USAID participation in economic development projects. Even though
a credible post-hoc argument might be made for applying the language
of Section 7 to such participation, that kind of extraterritorial applica-
tion was not envisioned by Congress and cannot easily be squared with
the provisions of the statute.
B. Superterritoriality and Multilateral Development Assistance
USAID is the primary institution through which the United States
government provides non-military foreign assistance. USAID provides
about $2 billion in loans and grants each year for development projects
in economically less developed countries (LDCs), such as the
Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka.' °4 These sums of money pale in con-
trast to the overall levels of assistance provided by the World Bank and
other multilateral development banks, which include the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African De-
velopment Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Those institutions lend over $30 billion each year for
development assistance, more than fifteen times as much as USAID.' °5
104. See AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CONGRESSIONAL PRES-
ENTATION FISCAL YEAR 1993, PART II 8-9 (1992) [hereinafter USAID 1993 PRESEN-
TATION]. USAID also provides another $3 billion annually in the form of non-project
economic support funds. See id.
105. OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGETING IN THE BUREAU FOR PROGRAM AND
POLICY COORDINATION OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, U.S.
OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS JULY 1, 1945 - SEPTEMBER
30, 1990 195 (1990). For example, World Bank loan commitments in fiscal year 1991
totaled $22.7 billion, compared with total 1991 USAID loan and grant commitments of
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The multilateral development banks differ from USAID not only in
the size of their operations but also in their legal and financial charac-
ters. These institutions are intergovernmental organizations outside
the control of any country's legal system. The World Bank, for exam-
ple, was established at the close of World War II by forty-five countries
and now has over 160 countries as members.1" 6 It gets its funds partly
from contributions by member governments and partly by borrowing
in international capital markets. It lends to LDCs at various interest
rates, mainly for development projects.10 7 Typically, these projects are
identified by the LDC's government, appraised by the World Bank,
and carried out through consulting and supply contracts financed by
the World Bank, often in conjunction with other foreign lenders.
The United States is the World Bank's largest participant, holding
about seventeen percent of the World Bank's total capital and about
the same percentage of total voting power. 1 The composition of the
World Bank's management and staff reflects the importance of the
United States role in the institution. The President of the World Bank
has always been an American, and many staff positions are held by
Americans. Those officials, however, are not United States govern-
ment employees. Rather, they are members of the international civil
service. The legal nexus between the United States government and the
World Bank is the Office of the U.S. Executive Director, an ambassa-
dor-level post filled by presidential appointment with the assistance of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The U.S. Executive Director is
one of twenty-two members of the World Bank's executive board.
Considering the enormous significance of the multilateral develop-
$2.7 billion. THE WORLD BANK, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1991) [hereinafter 1991
WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT]; USAID 1993 PRESENTATION, supra note 104, at 9.
106. THE WORLD BANK, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1992).
107. The World Bank Group consists technically of several entities. The two larg-
est ones are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD, established in 1945, ob-
tains most of its working funds from borrowings, on the basis of securities which are
themselves backed by the capital held by member countries. It lends those funds at
near-market rates. The IDA, in contrast, obtains most of its working funds from contri-
butions by the richer member countries, including the United States. The IDA makes
"soft loans," which are for longer terms and require no periodic interest payments.
John W. Head, Environmental Conditionality in the Operations of International Develop-
ment Finance Institutions, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 15-16 (1991).
108. 1991 WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 105, at 200, 213. Voting
power does not precisely mirror subscriptions, and the U.S. share in the IBRD is
slightly different from its share in the IDA. Id.
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ment banks in the financing of economic development projects in
LDCs, no consideration of the proper application of the ESA to devel-
opment assistance projects can be complete without a consideration
also of its applicability to these institutions - that is, its superter-
ritorial application. Can a case be made that Section 7 of the ESA
applies to United States involvement in the multilateral development
banks' financing of economic development projects?
Throughout the Defenders litigation, the lower courts brushed off
that question by denying that the World Bank is a federal agency. 109
This is the right answer to the wrong question. As noted above, the
operative verbs in Section 7 relating to agency "action" are susceptible
of several meanings (all of them probably unintended) when read in the
context of USAID participation in economic development projects.110
Similarly, the language of Section 7 may be interpreted in various ways
when read in the context of American involvement with the multilat-
eral development banks. Under some of these interpretations, the ESA
would have superterritorial application. In short, the fact that the
World Bank is not a "Federal agency" or instrumentality does not pre-
clude an imaginative interpretation by which the United States govern-
ment could, if it wanted to, apply Section 7 to United States
participation in the multilateral development banks.
There are several ways to reach this conclusion. The two key ele-
ments required to trigger the application of Section 7 are that there be
a "Federal agency," which includes federal "instrumentalities," and an
"action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency."111 The
Treasury Department, a federal agency, "authorizes" World Bank fi-
nancing for an economic development project by instructing the U.S.
Executive Director to vote in favor of the World Bank loan. The 1986
regulations define "action" as encompassing "all activities or programs
of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies." '12 Although the U.S. Executive Director is not
solely responsible for "authorizing" a World Bank loan, he or she car-
ries out a part of the process. This reading of the statute is expansive,
but it is not precluded by the statutory language.
An alternative application of Section 7 to U.S. participation in the
109. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
111. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1532(7) (1988).
112. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986) (emphasis added) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
(1991)).
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multilateral development banks would focus on the fact that loans
made by the World Bank through the "soft loan" window 1 3 are
"funded" in part by U.S. contributions to the World Bank, and not by
World Bank borrowings. Hence, another possible, though strained,
reading of Section 7 would have the Treasury Department as the "Fed-
eral agency," as in the first example, and would have the World Bank-
financed project as the relevant "action," also as in the first example.
The nexus between those two elements in this case, however, would be
the "funding," rather than the "authorizing," of the loan. In short, the
Treasury Department has funded, in part, every project financed by a
World Bank "soft loan."
Under either of these two interpretations, Section 7 of the ESA
would be triggered, and the Treasury Department would be required to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior in order to insure that the
World Bank-supported project is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species, threatened species, or critical
habitat. The consultation would have to occur before that project was
authorized (in part) or funded (in part) by the Treasury Department.
Under these interpretations - both of them strained but both of
them possible - Section 7 would have superterritorial application. 14
Was this intended? Almost surely not. As explained above, Congress
intended the ESA to have a broad reach, with international effects in
some respects.115 It seems clear, however, that Congress did not in-
tend for the Section 7 requirements to be triggered by U.S. participa-
tion in the multilateral development banks. Had Congress so intended,
113. See supra note 107 for a description of the "soft loan" operations of the Inter-
national Development Association.
114. There are two other imaginative interpretations by which U.S. participation in
the multilateral development banks might be considered to trigger Section 7. In both
cases the relevant "Federal agency" would be the Treasury Department, but the rele-
vant "action" would not be the World Bank-financed project. Under the first of these
interpretations, the relevant "action" would be the act of the U.S. Executive Director
casting a vote favoring such financing. The nexus between the "agency" and the "ac-
tion" in this case would be the Treasury Department's "authorization" of that vote.
Under the second interpretation, the "action" would be the transfer of IDA-destined
funds from the U.S. Treasury to the World Bank. Here, the nexus would be both (i) the
Treasury Department's "authorization" of the transfer of funds and (ii) its "carrying
out" of that transfer of funds. In both of these cases, unlike those described in the
preceding text, the relevant action (voting or transfer of funds) would be taken in the
United States. These would therefore not be examples of the ESA being given superter-
ritorial application. The result would, however, be the same: Section 7 of the ESA
would be triggered.
115. See supra notes 43-46, 90-95 and accompanying text.
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it could have and should have designed provisions that did not require
such strained interpretation. 16
IV. CHANGING THE ESA - SOME POSSIBILITIES AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS
Two conclusions emerge from the foregoing discussion. First, when
considering the extraterritorial application of Section 7 in the context
of economic development assistance, its superterritorial application
should also be considered. Second, Section 7 in its current form is ill-
suited for either extraterritorial application or superterritorial applica-
tion in the context of U.S. involvement in economic development
assistance.
Turning to the future, if Congress wants to extend the ambit of the
ESA, how far could it go? Specifically, would concerns over sover-
eignty of foreign states disallow extraterritorial application, as the gov-
ernment lawyers suggested in Defenders? Would concerns over the
special status of the multilateral development banks militate against
superterritorial application?
There is no legal barrier to such extensions. Congress has already
applied many forms of conditionality to USAID operations and other
foreign assistance programs. Bilateral development assistance has been
made conditional on the recipient country's adoption of policies ac-
ceptable to the United States on such subjects as abortion,117 human
rights,118 and freedom of the press.119 Similar conditionality applies in
116. Indeed, if Section 7 were interpreted as covering U.S. participation in the mul-
tilateral development banks, there would be no obvious logical reason not to interpret it
as also covering other instances of U.S. participation in multilateral activities partially
authorized, funded, or carried out by the United States. Should the Department of
Defense have consulted with the Department of the Interior on matters relating to en-
dangered species before undertaking Operation Desert Storm in 1991?
117. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(3) (1990) (prohibition on use of funds for researching
abortions as a means of family planning). See also Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2257 (1991) (upholding USAID's policy of making family planning grants to foreign
nongovernmental organizations conditional on the organizations' certifying that they
did not perform or promote abortion as method of family planning).
118. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1990) (prohibiting financial assistance to countries en-
gaging in patterns of gross violations of human rights). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2426(b)
(1988) (conditioning economic development assistance on absence of discrimination
against U.S. employees on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex).
119. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-189, § 29, 87 Stat. 714 (1973) (re-
pealed by Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-559, § 29(b), 88 Stat. 1795 (1974))
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other contexts as well. For example, an LDC is ineligible for a prefer-
ential tariff treatment if its government fails to (1) recognize and up-
hold internationally accepted human rights, (2) enforce arbitral
awards, or (3) cooperate in prevention of drug trafficking and
terrorism. 
120
If conditionality in the provision of economic development assist-
ance has not been seen as a violation of sovereignty in these other con-
texts, why would it appear so in the context of wildlife preservation?
The claims of foreign state sovereignty raised by the government law-
yers seem ill-founded on this point. Making the provision of bilateral
development assistance conditional on the protection of wildlife cannot
reasonably be said to impose "statutory restrictions on the activities of
foreign governments," as the government lawyers claimed. 21 More-
over, the contention that such wildlife-protection conditionality might
offend the sensibilities of foreign governments hardly reflects any legal
bar to the use of such conditionality.' 22
Some observers have turned the government lawyers' foreign-state-
sovereignty objection on its head. Instead of finding that wildlife-pro-
tection conditionality would constitute an invasion of state sovereignty,
they argue that the United States has an obligation under international
law to ensure that actions of federal agencies do not cause any environ-
mental injury, including injury to a species or its habitat. One of the
(access of U.S. media correspondents to foreign military bases supported by the United
States).
120. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (b)(5)-(7) (1988).
121. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 16. See also Amidi Curiae Brief of American Asso-
ciation of Zoological Parks & Aquariums and Friends of the Earth in Support of Re-
spondents at 16-26, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-
1424) [hereinafter Zoo Brief] (addressing conditionality of U.S. assistance to foreign
countries). In a related point, the government lawyers claimed that the conduct of U.S.
persons or agents in gathering data for the assessment required under the ESA could
constitute an invasion of sovereignty if not consented to by the foreign state's govern-
ment. Petitioner's Brief at 35-43, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)
(No. 90-1424). While the statement is true, the argument is unpersuasive. If the foreign
government objects to the gathering of data, USAID's refusal to support the project (for
failure of the conditionality to be fulfilled) would still not constitute an invasion of sov-
ereignty. As a practical matter, environmental assessments for projects financed by
multilateral development banks are primarily the responsibility of the governments
seeking the financing. In order to facilitate such assessments, technical assistance grants
are often made available. See, eg., THE WORLD BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 39, 65
n.22 (discussing Technical Assistance Grant Program for the Environment).
122. The government lawyers' claim on this point is deftly refuted by one of the
amicus briefs in Defenders. See Zoo Brief, supra note 121, at 8-9.
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amicus briefs in Defenders, for example, cited the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration in support of the proposition that every country is respon-
sible for insuring that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states.123 Similarly, the Re-
statement on United States Foreign Relations Law recognizes an obli-
gation to act "so as not to cause significant injury to the environment
of another state . . ,124
Accordingly, Congress is not legally barred from giving Section 7
extraterritorial application in the context of United States support for
economic development assistance projects. Although the precise for-
mulation of Section 7 (including the "authorized, funded, or carried
out" language and the "insure" notion) would require modification to
make it applicable to USAID-financed projects, the wildlife-protection
conditionality that the extraterritorial application of Section 7 would
constitute could not reasonably be attacked on grounds that it would
violate foreign state sovereignty.
Some of the same reasoning applies to the prospect of giving Section
7 superterritorial application. Just as conditionality is a familiar aspect
of U.S. bilateral development assistance, it likewise appears often in
U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks.12
Specifically, Congress has repeatedly imposed conditions on the ex-
ercise of the "voice and vote" of the U.S. in the multilateral develop-
ment banks and on U.S. financial support for them.'26 The "voice and
123. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972) (cited
in Amicus Curiae Brief of Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil, Slovak Union of Nature
and Landscape Protectors, Fundacion de Parques Nacionales of Costa Rica, and Green-
peace International in Support of Respondents, at 10, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424) [hereinafter Greenpeace Brief]).
124. RFsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601(1)(b) (1987).
According to the amicus brief fied on behalf of Greenpeace, "[tihe extraterritorial ap-
plication of... the Endangered Species Act... fulfills the obligation" reflected in that
provision. Greenpeace Brief, supra note 123, at 9. See also Marsha L. Anastasia, Note,
The Endangered Species Act and State Sovereignty: Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 7
CoNN. J. INT'L L. 87, 119-22 (1991) (examining standards for imposing liability on
countries that cause environmental injury).
125. Conditionality is also a common ingredient to the financing provided by the
multilateral development banks to borrowing member countries. See, eg., Head, supra
note 107, at 15-26.
126. See Jonathan Earl Sanford, U.S. Policy Toward the Multilateral Development
Banks: The Role of Congress, 22 GF-o. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1, 19-25 (1988) for a
comprehensive survey of both the "voice and vote" conditionality and the "power of the
purse" conditionality.
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vote" conditionality usually takes the form of prohibiting the U.S. Ex-
ecutive Director at each such bank from voting in favor of proposed
loans having particular characteristics. Congress has used this type of
conditionality to express its views on a range of topics, including
human rights,12 7 democratic government, 128 expropriation, 129 and
drug trafficking.
1 30
Congress has also imposed "voice and vote" conditionality in the
area of environmental protection. Legislation enacted in 1989131 re-
quires that the U.S. Executive Director at each of the multilateral de-
velopment banks withhold support for any project that has not been
subjected to an environmental assessment.1 32 This is the most blatant
form of environmental conditionality imposed by Congress thus far on
127. 22 U.S.C. § 262d(a) (1988) (instructing the U.S. government to oppose loans to
countries whose governments engage in "a pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights" or provide "refuge to individuals committing acts of interna-
tional terrorism by hijacking aircraft").
128. A 1989 act required the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Execu-
tive Directors of the multilateral development banks to vote against any loan to Panama
unless the President certifies that Panama has made substantial progress toward estab-
lishing a democratic civilian government. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-461, § 564, 102 Stat. 2268,
2268-40 (1988), cited in Sanford, supra note 126, at 102.
129. 22 U.S.C. § 283r (1988) (calling for U.S. Executive Directors to vote against
loans to countries that have expropriated investments owned by U.S. citizens unless
arrangements are made for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation), cited in San-
ford, supra note 126, at 102.
130. International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(h)(1)(B) (1988)
(calling for U.S. Executive Directors to vote against loans to any country that is a major
producer or transit site for illicit drugs), cited in Sanford, supra note 126, at 103.
131. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 2492 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
132. The Act specifically provides:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director
of each multilateral development bank not to vote in favor of any action proposed
to be taken by the respective bank which would have a significant effect on the
human environment, unless for at least 120 days before the date of the vote... an
assessment analyzing the environmental impacts of the proposed action has been
completed by the borrowing country or the institution, and been made available to
the board of directors of the institution.
Id. at § 521(a) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 262m-7(a)). In June 1992, the
Treasury Department announced procedures enabling the public to review the environ-
mental assessments supplied by the multilateral development banks. Environmental
Review of Actions by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), 57 Fed. Reg. 24,545
(1992) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 26) (proposed June 10, 1992).
Washington University Open Scholarship
82 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:59
U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks. 13 3
Congress could easily do the same for wildlife protection. That is, if
it wants to give superterritorial effect to Section 7 of the ESA in order
to press the multilateral development banks to strengthen their com-
mitment to protecting wildlife,13 1 Congress can impose conditions to
this effect on the Secretary of the Treasury's discretion in instructing
the U.S. Executive Directors at the multilateral development banks to
vote for or against particular loan proposals. Congress cannot, of
course, directly dictate policies to the banks themselves, but imposing
such wildlife-protection conditionality on U.S. participation in the
banks probably would prove influential.
Legislation giving the ESA superterritorial application could take
several forms. For example, if Congress' commitment to wildlife con-
servation runs so deep as to reject any American involvement in a pro-
ject posing any threat to an endangered or threatened species, then
Congress could require that the U.S. Executive Director not support a
loan for such a project. This would be "voice and vote" conditionality.
Alternatively, if Congress were to judge that a particular multilateral
development bank had not shown a strong enough sensitivity to wild-
life conservation generally, Congress could order a withdrawal of all
United States support and funding for that bank. This would consti-
tute "power of the purse" conditionality.
133. Congress has, however, directed that the U.S. "voice and vote" be used to
influence these institutions' environmental policies in other ways. For example, Con-
gress has directed the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors
at the multilateral development banks "to support the strengthening of education pro-
grams within each multilateral development bank to improve the capacity of mid-level
managers to initiate and manage environmental aspects of development activities, and
to train officials in borrowing countries in the conduct of environmental analyses." 22
U.S.C. § 262m-4 (1990). See also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2621(a) (1992) (calling for U.S. Execu-
tive Directors to "promote vigorously ... the expansion of programs in areas which
address the problem of global climate change").
134. The environmental assessment procedures of the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank already expressly provide for issues of wildlife protection to be
taken into account. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER
NUMBER 139, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SOURCEBOOK, VOL. I., POLICIES, PRO-
CEDURES, AND CROSS SECTORAL IsSUES 35 (1991) (reprinting World Bank Operational
Directive 4.00, stating that environmental assessments should address biological diver-
sity, including conservation of endangered plants and animals). Loan documents for
projects financed by these institutions often include covenants aimed at wildlife protec-
tion. For example, in one Sri Lankan project (not the Mahaweli project), the loan
agreement between the Asian Development Bank and Sri Lanka called for protection of
the existing elephant population. (Relevant documents on file with authors.)
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In drafting legislation to give superterritorial application to Section
7, Congress would need to recognize that some types of conditionality
might be less effective than others. A study of the effectiveness of con-
gressional attempts to influence multilateral development bank opera-
tions concluded that "voice and vote" conditionality has generally
proven more effective than "power of the purse" conditionality - that
is, requirements or threats to cut United States financial support for
multilateral development banks.'35 That study also identified certain
limits to the influence Congress can exercise over those banks136 and
cautioned against the indiscriminate imposition of conditionality. 13 7
In sum, giving superterritorial application to Section 7 of the ESA
would be a delicate matter. Because of the indirect link between the
United States and the individual development projects that the multi-
lateral development banks finance, the mechanism for expressing U.S.
commitment to wildlife conservation would require careful formula-
tion in order to make it effective."3 After all, the policy of Congress as
declared in the ESA is "that all Federal departments and agencies shall
seek to conserve" wildlife at risk.'39 Congress will need to make a
careful calculation of what sort of superterritorial approach, if any, will
best serve that policy.
135. Sanford, supra note 126, at 67-77.
136. Id. at 77-85. According to Sanford, Congress can influence multilateral devel-
opment bank operations in the following way: First, Congress must persuade the Ad-
ministration to advocate a particular requirement. Second, the Administration must
persuade other major member countries of the multilateral development bank to sup-
port the initiative. Third, the United States and its allies must vote to require the bank's
management to champion the new initiative. Finally, the bank must persuade borrow-
ing countries to incorporate the initiative into new loans. Id. at 79.
137. Sanford advised that:
[flor maximum effect, confrontational tactics [for example, cutting financial sup-
port to the multilateral development bank] should probably be reserved for the
most serious and far-reaching issues .... For issues of secondary importance, or
cases where other member countries are unlikely to relent, less dramatic legislative
tools [for example, requiring Executive Directors to focus their efforts on persua-
sion through their "voice and vote"] may be more effective devices for realizing
U.S. goals.
Id. at 91.
138. This is a question of "loss of leverage." If the United States expresses its com-
mitment to wildlife conservation by avoiding involvement with any project posing any
risk to wildlife, then the United States will probably lose the opportunity to influence
project preparation in such a way as to reduce that risk. See Petitioner's Brief at 45,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (1988).
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
One of the most significant issues presented by the Defenders case
was not squarely addressed by any of the courts involved: how should
U.S. commitment to wildlife conservation be expressed in the context
of economic development assistance in other countries, such as the
Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka?
A look beyond the Supreme Court's Defenders decision reveals a
need to scrutinize carefully whether and how Section 7 of the ESA
should be given either extraterritorial application or superterritorial
application. Much is legally possible in this regard, but what is wise?
Congress has plenty of scope for imposing wildlife-protection condi-
tionality both on USAID operations and on U.S. participation in the
multilateral development banks. Most development assistance projects
that USAID supports in foreign countries (including the Mahaweli
project), however, are multilateral in character. USAID is only one
participant of many. A simplistic extension of Section 7 requirements
to consult and to insure against risk to wildlife may be inappropriate in
that context. Likewise, the character of this country's role in the mul-
tilateral development banks demands that efforts to influence those in-
stitutions in the area of wildlife conservation be undertaken with an eye
to effectiveness, not emotion alone.
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